Our paramount and fundamental question is this: can something other than the mind affect the subjectivity of the subject? And is the world anything other than the perception of the subject? For a long time, this writing of mine has been mistakenly and gravely misconstrued as a kind of idealism and subjectivism, as if I were claiming that the world is nothing but our illusion. Yet the sequence of such a claim yields nothing of the sort. Firstly, affirming an illusion necessarily entails believing, in addition to it, in the existence of a reality\/truth other than it \u2013 which is not the case. Secondly, the label \u201cidealism\u201d is superfluous here. Consider the study: the apprehension and organisation of a scientific system for rationality and subjectivity is not idealism; it is merely an attempt to prepare an answer to the question: \u201cHow do we think?\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Can the subjectivity of the subject be affected by any other abstract thing whatsoever? Can the subjectivity of the subject, by virtue of its gazing upon its own subjectivity, bear witness that that subjectivity and its noetic station can be affected by something? For this appears to stand against the abstract definition we give of subjectivity. On the other hand, the explanation that subjectivity is a physiological network \u2013 and that these affections speak, in fact, from a meta-scientific, meta-rational, and extra-subjective position, which can only be accepted through the authority derived from revelation and intuition \u2013 this explanation is problematic. It becomes difficult to conceive that the subject could will something without first having perceived it. And for this same reason, it is hard to accept that anything other than the subject\u2019s own quotidian subjectivity influences his knowledge. For even if external factors do influence his subjectivity, he has no actual consciousness or self-consciousness of them. Thus, whatever his subjectivity may be, in a redefinition it remains what it is; and in accordance with what it is, it is this subjectivity that is directed toward the primacy of external matters. Therefore, to measure the affection of the subject, the subject again places those external matters at a secondary, outer level and makes them the object of its investigation. Hence we say that subjectivity is something abstract. The correspondence of physiological relations with bodily function, and then with mental health, and their totality in relation to the station of subjectivity, and the investigation of these matters in laboratories \u2013 none of this determines anything beyond a mere correspondence, nor does it in any way conclude with signification, or perhaps with the ontological priority of one over the other. These cannot be deduced from them. For this reason, subjectivity is epistemically prior to anything that comes after it; and only two subjects, in relation to one another, can shape an other-conscious, self-conscious, and dialectical relation of this kind. The critique of the Neo-Kantians and the existentialists of the nineteenth century is of this same tenor. Nietzsche\u2019s famous critique in The Will to Power<\/em> \u2013 when he regards causality as an illusion of direct human volition \u2013 rests upon this evidently clear argument: that the mechanism is itself something that has been studied, claimed by the subject; and all these matters, except for a negative aspect, possess no clear positive form.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Only that knowledge can become the object of a genuine, systematic, and scientific investigation which has a positively formal aspect. Just as, in a customary manner, we ontologically prioritise a thing over a fictitious one \u2013 even if that thing is also temporally prior, epistemically speaking \u2013 it has ontological priority over that which follows from it. In this matter, the positive, as is apparent from the convention in its definition, is something that is first known, and then makes possible, either potentially or actually, the negation for the subject. In any relation, what the subject apprehends and, for the first time, comes to know is something that, in its own kind and within the dialectic in which it is situated, is a material that serves as the ideal of knowledge for itself. For this specific reason, negative science can bring forth the dialectical function of things and the world, but conceptually, it is not a concept that would be an instance of a signifying science by measure and analogy. At this juncture, the problem of the present section is the problem of the form of the proposition and its relation to its content.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The specific and general problem of our surrounding world is, on the one hand, the supposition that it is the content of propositions that produces their final formal shape. Hence, there is an inner truth hidden behind worldly events \u2013 indeed, not even that this concealed truth has become concealed in the movement of these forms; and, in the Heideggerian manner, truth as something unconcealed emerges from this concealing movement. Thus we suppose that a here-and-now declarative proposition truly reports on the essence of the subject-noun, through the association of content \u2013 whereas, in fact, every positive proposition is initially only a performative proposition. For it is only after the form of the proposition has taken shape that the subject-noun of those propositions acquires a core and a truth. Otherwise, outside the state of movement, the subject-noun, without any sign, is merely a simple subject-noun; and in a negative state, it is returned to the proposition that has been shaped in the performative mode of the proposition \u2013 a proposition which we then revert to its own simple and abstract state.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Our paramount and fundamental question is this: can something other than the mind affect the subjectivity of the subject? And is the world anything other than the perception of the subject? For a long time, this writing of mine has been mistakenly and gravely misconstrued as a kind of idealism and subjectivism, as if I […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-538","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-editoral"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/jarideha.sahran.ir\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/538","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/jarideha.sahran.ir\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/jarideha.sahran.ir\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/jarideha.sahran.ir\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/jarideha.sahran.ir\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=538"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/jarideha.sahran.ir\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/538\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":540,"href":"https:\/\/jarideha.sahran.ir\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/538\/revisions\/540"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/jarideha.sahran.ir\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=538"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/jarideha.sahran.ir\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=538"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/jarideha.sahran.ir\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=538"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}