{"id":541,"date":"2026-05-08T18:07:47","date_gmt":"2026-05-08T14:37:47","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/jarideha.sahran.ir\/?p=541"},"modified":"2026-05-08T18:07:47","modified_gmt":"2026-05-08T14:37:47","slug":"several-inquiries-into-moral-logic-practical-form-and-nature-our-inheritance-seeking-and-historical-disjunction-i","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/jarideha.sahran.ir\/?p=541","title":{"rendered":"Several Inquiries into Moral Logic, Practical Form, and Nature; Our Inheritance-Seeking and Historical Disjunction (I)"},"content":{"rendered":"\n
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(…Among the points that ought to be raised here and not forgotten:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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  1. War has taken shape prior to peace; how, through war, armies, etc., certain economic relations \u2013 such as wage labour, the use of machinery, etc. \u2013 took shape before their emergence within the heart of bourgeois society.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  2. Also the relation between productive forces and relations of intercourse, especially visible in the army. The relation between current historiography \u2013 which is the historiography of thought \u2013 and real historiography. What is called, by convention, the history of civilisation, which also includes the history of all religions and states. (If opportunity and occasion arise, something could also be said about the various kinds of historiography up to now: so-called objective, subjective (moral and the like), and philosophical historiography.)<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  3. Secondary and tertiary relations of production, essentially derived, fictive: relations that are not authentic. Here I shall raise international relations.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  4. The accusations levelled against this approach for being materialist. The relation with naturalistic materialism.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  5. The dialectic of the concepts of productive force (means of production) and relations of production; a dialectic whose boundaries must be determined and which does not negate real distinction.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  6. The uneven development of material production, taking the example of artistic production. Fundamentally, we should not place the concept of progress in the mould of common abstraction. Let us not regard this disproportion with art as merely important and difficult \u2013 (more important and difficult than this disproportion) within the framework of practical-social relations themselves, for example, the relation with education. The relation of the United States to Europe. The truly difficult point we must examine here is how relations of production, as legal relations, enter into uneven development \u2013 thus the relation of Roman private law (and in criminal and public law, which is less discussed) with modern production.<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  7. This conception appears to be bound to necessary development, but the legitimacy of contingency and accident (do not forget). How. (Freedom and other things as well.) (The influence of means of communication; world history has not always existed; history as the result of world history.)<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  8. The point of departure is naturally determination by nature: subjective and objective. Tribes, races, etc.)
    \u2014 Karl Marx, Grundrisse<\/em>, Introduction. [IV, M-21]<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

    Before and above all else, the question of ethics and morality, and the relation of the one who wills to action with morality, must at this juncture be brought into the middle of discourse and into difficulty, and thereby its form become manifest to us. For an encounter with Marx in such a manner, we must pose a preliminary question to Marx\u2019s own epoch, inasmuch as the relation between my willing self and my praxis must determine our problem, as a political matter, within our political will. A glance, however minimal, at our surrounding circumstances suffices to make us aware of this: the problem of myself, an Iranian, and on a larger scale, of myself as a human being of the 21st century, is my will-lessness and my moral torpor. From politics and democracy to economic progress, financial entanglements, and interpersonal relations, even in the simplest everyday matters, thus, to preserve intersubjectivity, we regard extra-textual reference with suspicion. The question concerning Marx \u2013 if it is for the purpose of inquiring into economics and testing the will that we ought politically to exercise, and thus we have in mind the political-economic Marx \u2013 must, before any other problem, speak of the how and the proper modality of political willing and its possibility. For the specific reason that the dualistic and romantic subject still stands, in relation to the reason that exercises that particular will, in a positional inversion. To put it more clearly, we subjects, as we are, must first consider the possibility of will, the limits of our will, and the kinship of will with form, end, and means. By what guarantee do we exercise a will and then accept responsibility for the resulting consequence? For such an event, we must at least have conceived of the outcome of our action in its desirable form. The inquiry we seek concerns the relation between the form of the object of will and its end, and how the form of the so-called collective will takes shape. It is through this passage that we turn to dialectics. The paramount question is: how do the wills of individuals relate to one another? And by this same method, we inquire into the form of the possibility of history and of historical occurrence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    At this stage, what we must speak of is the history that has passed over us. And yet, if we acknowledge that in the very essence of that which has passed, there is no connection whatsoever with the present \u2013 for to negate this claim we would have to posit historical causality as established, that is, to suppose that we at least perceive, or can perceive, the addition and continuity of the form of a past event with another event, i.e., the signification of the two together \u2013 even in this case, past history, insofar as it makes us aware of our resultant inheritance, is among the specifically necessary sciences. And for this task, even a methodological re-reading and revision of history is not required. Our problem in this section is not the science of history itself, but rather the historical continuity of the will of our ancestors with us. We speak of what happened in the past, but that part of science which ought to address \u201cso what?\u201d remains crippled. The narration of events is impossible without investigating how they have taken form; and this latter science, through its determined and synthesised direction, attains the importance of dialectics.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Thus, the question of ethics \u2013 and, in a related order, of every kind of human will within uncommon conceptualisations \u2013 shapes the present inquiry. The manifest and distilled core of the story is this:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      \n
    1. Can the human will be an unethical will? Can a human being do something that, at least in his own view, is unethical? And does it have any meaning at all that a human being, and human subjectivity, can choose anything other than what he considers right?<\/li>\n\n\n\n
    2. If, in the previous question, we concluded that we cannot (conceptually and possibly) choose other than what we know to be morally good, then does talk of nature, utility, and any extra-referential or extra-textual matter have any meaning?<\/li>\n\n\n\n
    3. Ultimately, if the human will is formal and is the subject of ethics, then is his political will also not in line with that moral belief? Or is political ethics something other than individual ethics, even contrary and opposed to it?<\/li>\n\n\n\n
    4. This juncture leads us to the question of the relation between ethics, religion, and politics, and we must address the formation and formal possibility of political will, and the how of this possibility. The present section deals specifically with the first question:<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n

      What is the pure ethical proposition \u2013 even if we call it the categorical imperative? In the previous section (I), we spoke a little of this. Here we ask again: in the form of the ethical proposition, is the association of the two sides of the proposition possible? In other words, is the relation of subject-noun to predicate in itself associable, or are the copulas \u2013 which decree negation or affirmation \u2013 the important and performative part of the proposition? When we look at the subject-noun of the ethical proposition, do we see anything other than one form among possible forms that could come to human will? And then, in the concept and the form of the being-ness of this subject-noun, do we see good and evil? This romantic and anti-rational claim \u2013 that ethical propositions initially report on the essence of their own subject-noun \u2013 is an epistemological claim that must be seen on a larger scale and examined: is such a thing at all possible, namely, reporting on the core of a thing, and apart from the phenomenon of that thing? Then we must ask: what is the phenomenon of a thing? And then say: what judgment does this render in ethics?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      Every categorical imperative is, initially and ultimately, a positive proposition and concept. If we come to understand that what is meant by an ethical proposition is only our willing, and that the subject of the moral law is the will in development \u2013 then we rearrange the ethical proposition in such a manner that it has the following form: \u201cThe human will ought\/ought not to perform such-and-such a volitionable act.\u201d And if we further grasp that will can only be understood through affirmation, then at the beginning of every categorical imperative we will conclude that the ethical proposition cannot be conditional, negative, or of any other possible category; rather, it is certainly and affirmatively positive. In the sequel of the proposition, however, we return to a discussion I proposed in the previous paragraph, namely: can a human being do anything other than what he knows to be right? And is the subject of the science of ethics anything other than performative utterance, command, and the correctness of science? Since the subject, in a single temporal and spatial moment, among all his own self\u2019s choices, and in comparison and relation to all other possible actions, has the condition to choose only one condition from among these \u2013 therefore, however conditional or negative an ethical or imperative proposition may appear, in the end, human will is confronted only with a possible and formal affirmation, whereby even if he does not do something, this very non-doing is accepted as an act.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      The end of every thing is found in its form, and the ideal of that thing likewise: when we intend something, we can only consider its form:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

      \n

      \u201cThis infinitude is a spurious or negative infinitude, for it is nothing other than the negation of the finite; but the finite thereby arises again in the same manner, and consequently has not been surpassed. In other words, this infinitude only posits the condition that the finite must be surpassed. This progress to the infinite does not go beyond the expression of the contradiction that the finite contains, namely, that it is both something and its other; and this progress is the eternal alternation of these determinations, each producing the other.\u201d (Translation as given.)<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

      The first thing that comes, in childhood, into the vessel of reason, and that matures in old age \u2013 so to speak \u2013 is the form of things, and nothing more or less. By that same simple relation: the only unit that claims its own unity is the form of every thing.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

      Before and above all else, the question of ethics and morality, and the relation of the one who wills to action with morality, must at this juncture be brought into the middle of discourse and into difficulty, and thereby its form become manifest to us. For an encounter with Marx in such a manner, we […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-541","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-editoral"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/jarideha.sahran.ir\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/541","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/jarideha.sahran.ir\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/jarideha.sahran.ir\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/jarideha.sahran.ir\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/jarideha.sahran.ir\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=541"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/jarideha.sahran.ir\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/541\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":542,"href":"https:\/\/jarideha.sahran.ir\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/541\/revisions\/542"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/jarideha.sahran.ir\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=541"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/jarideha.sahran.ir\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=541"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/jarideha.sahran.ir\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=541"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}